It has been argued elsewhere that a logic programming language with function variables and λ-abstractions within terms makes a good meta-programming language, especially when an object-language contains notions of bound variables and scope. The λProlog logic programming language and the related Elf and Isabelle systems provide meta-programs with both function .variables and λ-abstractions by containing implementations of higher-order unification. This paper presents a logic programming language, called Lλ, that also contains both function variables and λ-abstractions, although certain restrictions are placed on occurrences of function variables. As a result of these restrictions, an implementation of Lλ does not need to implement full higher order unification. Instead, an extension to first-order unification that respects bound variable names and scopes is all that is required. Such unification problems are shown to be decidable and to possess most general unifiers when unifiers exist. A unification algorithm and logic programming interpreter are described and proved correct. Several examples of using Lλ as a meta-programming language are presented. Abstract: It has been argued elsewhere that a logic programming language with function variables and A-abstractions within terms makes a good meta-programming language, especially when an object-language contains notions of bound variables and scope. The AProlog logic programming language and the related Elf and Isabelle systems provide meta-programs with both function .variables and A-abstractions by containing implementations of higher-order unification. This paper presents a logic programming language, called LA, that also contains both function variables and A-abstractions, although certain restrictions are placed on occurrences of function variables. As a result of these restrictions, an implementation of LA does not need to implement full higherorder unification. Instead, an extension to first-order unification that respects bound variable names and scopes is all that is required. Such unification problems are shown to be decidable and to possess most general unifiers when unifiers exist. A unification algorithm and logic programming interpreter are described and proved correct. Several examples of using LA as a meta-programming language are presented.
Introduction
A meta-programming language should be able to represent and manipulate such syntactic structures as programs, formulas, types, and proofs. A common characteristic of all these structures is that they involve notions of abstractions, scope, bound and free variables, substitution instances, and equality up to alphabetic change of bound variables. Although the data types available in most computer programming languages are, of course, rich enough to represent all these kinds of structures, such data types do not have direct support for these common characteristics. For example, although it is trivial to represent first-order formulas in Lisp, it is a more complex matter to write Lisp programs that correctly substitute a term into a formulas (being careful not to capture bound variables), to test for the equality of formulas up to alphabetic variation, and to determine if a certain variable's occurrence is free or bound. This situation is the same when structures like programs or (natural deduction) proofs are to be manipulated or when other programming languages, such as Pascal, Prolog, and ML, replace Lisp.
It is desirable for a meta-programming language to have language-level support for these various aspects of object-level syntax. What is a common framework for representing these structures? Early work by Church, Curry, Howard, Martin-Lof, Scott, S trachey, Tait, and others concluded that typed and untyped A-calculi provide a common 2.2. Discharging constants from terms. Consider a first-order logic whose logical connectives are A (conjunction), 2 (implication), and V (universal quantification). Let A be a syntactic variable that ranges over atomic formulas, and let D and G range over formulas defined by the following grammar:
It has been argued in various places (for example, [17, 221) that the intuitionistic theory of these formulas provides a foundation for logic programming if programs are identified with collections of D-formulas and goals or queries with G-formulas. As a logic programming language, it forms a rich extension to Horn clauses and still retains several import ant properties that malie it suit able for program specification and implementation.
One of those important properties is that a simple operational interpretation of the logical connectives is sound and non-deterministically complete with respect to intuitionistic logic. This operational interpretation can be described as follows. Let C be a first-order signature (set of constants), let P be a finite set of closed D-formulas, and let G be a closed G-formula, both over C (i.e., all of whose non-logical constants are from C). Intuitionistic provability of G from C and P, written as C; P F I G, can be characterized using the following search operations: AND: C ; P tI GI A G2 if C; P F I G1 and C; P Gz.
AUGMENT: C; P F I D > G if C; P U {D} k I G.
GENERIC: C; P t r Vx.G if C U {c}; P F I [x -c]G, provided that c is not in C.
BACKCHAIN: C; P F I A if there is a formula D E P whose universal instantiation with closed terms over C is A or is G > A and C; P F I G.
Clearly, this characterization of intuitionistic provability can be shaped into a simple theorem proving mechanism. Such a mechanism using unification and a depth-first searching discipline can be used to give a Prolog-style implementation of this logic. Notice that both components to the left of the turnstile may vary within the search for a proof. For example, the terms used to instantiate the universal quantifiers mentioned in the BACKCHAIN rule can be taken from different signatures at different parts of a proof.
While this logic has its uses (for example, see [15, 16, 17] ), there is a kind of incompleteness in its space of values. Consider the following example. Let Co be a signature containing at least the constants append, cons, nil, a, b and let Po contain just the two formulas VxVlVkVm(append I k m > append (cons x E ) I; (cons x m)) Vk(append nil k k). Now, consider the problem of finding a substitution term over Co for the variable X so that the goal formula Vy(append (cons a (cons b nil)) y X) is provable. Proving this goal can be reduced to finding an instantiation of X so that
(append (cons a (cons b nil)) k X )
is provable, where k is not a member of Co. Using BACKCHAIN twice, this goal is provable if and only if X can be instantiated with (cons a (cons b k)). This is not possible, however, since X can be instantiated with terms over Co but not over Co U {k} .
Such a failure here is quite sensible since the value of X should be independent of the choice of the constant used to instantiate Vy. It might be desirable, however, to have this computation succeed if this particular choice of constant could be abstracted away. That is, an interesting value is computed here, but it cannot be used since it is not well defined. Admitting A-abstraction into this logic provides a representation of such a value.
Consider, for example, proving the goal Vy (append (cons a (cons b nil)) y ( H y)) where H is a functional variable that may be.instantiated with a A-term whose constants are again from the set Co. Assume that Vy is again instantiated with the constant k. This time, ( H k) must equal (cons a (cons b k)). There are two simply-typed A-terms (up to A-conversion) that when substituted for H into ( H k ) and then Anormalized yield (cons a (cons b k)), namely, the terms Aw (cons a (cons b k)) and Aw (cons a (cons b w)). Since H cannot contain k free, only the second of these possible substitutions will succeed in being a legal solution for this goal. In a sense, the A-term Aw (cons a (cons b w)) is the result of discharging the constant k from the term (cons a (cons b k)). Notice, however, that discharging a first-order constant from a first-order term is now a "second-order" term: it can be used to instantiate a function variable. The higher-order variable H in the above example is restricted in such a way that when it is involved in a solvable unification problem, there is a single, most general unifier for it. We shall define LA in such a way that this is the only kind of "higherorder" unification problem that can occur. All such uses of a higher-order variable will be associated with discharging a constant from a term. Term models for P-reduction of the simply typed A-calculus interpret a A-term, say Ax.t of type T t a, as a mapping from A-equivalence classes of type T to such equivalence classes of type a. In LA, this functional interpretation must be restricted greatly: Ax.t can be thought of as a function that carries an increment in a signature to a term over that increment.
The reader who is comfortable with the above discussion may wish to read Section 10 next where several examples of LA programs are given and discussed.
Logical Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic properties of X-terms, Xconversion, and logic built on top of simply typed X-terms. Some definitions and properties are reviewed below. See [l, 3, 121 for more complete presentations.
Untyped X-terms are built up from a set of tokens and from application and abstraction in the usual way. Occurrence of tokens in terms are classified as either free or bound occurrences. Expressions of the form Xx (t x) are called 7-redexes (provided x is not free in t) while expressions of the form (Ax t)s are called P-redexes. A term is X-normal if it contains no , f3 or 77-redexes. The expression t = s means that t and s are a-convertible. The term r P-reduces to the term r' if r has an occurrence of a O-redex, say (Ax t)s, and r' is the result of replacing that redex with the result of substituting s for x in t (changing bound variable names to avoid variable capture). The term r 7-reduces to the term r' if r has an occurrence of an 77-redex, say Ax (t x), and r' is the result of replacing that redex with t. The binary relation Xconv, denoting X-conversion, is defined so that t Xconv s if there is a list of terms t l , . . . , t,, with n > 1, t equal to t l , s equal to t,, and for i = 1 , . . . , n -1, either ti relates to ti+1 or ti+1 relates to ti by a-conversion or by by ,B or q-reduction. If a term can be converted to a X-normal term, that normal term is unique up to the name of bound variables. If t is a X-term then Xnorm(t) denotes its X-normal form. Since not all untyped X-terms have X-normal forms, this function is partial. When applied to simply typed versions of X-terms (as below), X-normal forms always exist, and this function is then total. A X-normal term that is not a top-level abstraction is of the form (htl . . . t,) where h is a token. This token is the head of this term.
Substitutions are finite association lists written as [xl I+ s l , . . . , x, I+ s,], where the variables xl , . . . , x, are all distinct. The list xl , . . . , x, is the domain of this substitution. If n = 0, this substitution is the empty substitution. When a substitution is applied to a term, it denotes the operation of simultaneous substitution, systematically changing bound variables in order to avoid variable capture. If T is a set of terms and q is a substitution, then yT = {qt I t E T}. Two substitutions, cp and $, are equal if their domains are equal and if whenever x H t E cp and x H s E $ then s Xconv t. The notation cp o li, denotes the composition of two substitutions. Functionally (9 o 
and as an association list, z H t E 9 o $ if z is in the domain of cp and t is $(pz) or z is in the domain of 1C, and not in the domain of cp and t is $2.
Let S be a fixed, finite set of primitive types (also called sorts). The set of types is the smallest set of expressions that contains the primitive types and is closed under the construction of function types, built using the binary, infix symbol -+. This arrow associates to the right: read TI + TZ + TS as 71 + (T2 + T~) .
The Greek letters T and a are used as syntactic variables ranging over types.
Let T be the type TI + --. + T, --+ TO where TO E S and n > 0. (By convention, if n = 0 then T is simply the type TO.) The types 71,. . . , T, are the argument types of T while the type TO is the target type of T. The order of a type T is defined as follows: If T E S then r has order 0; otherwise, the order of r is one greater than the maximum order of the argument types of r . Thus, T has order 1 exactly when T is of the form 71 + + T, + TO where n > 1 and { T~, T~, . .
.,T,)
S.
A signature (over S) is a finite set C of pairs of tokens and types that satisfies the usual functionality condition: a given token is associated with at most one type in a given signature. This paper assumes the additional restriction that if a quantified variable is of type T then T does not contain the primitive type o. Thus, predicate quantification is not permitted in this logic. There are various ways to allow forms of predicate quantification in this setting: one approach is described in [22, 251 and another is described in [16] . The kinds of meta-programs that we discuss here do not require any forms of predicate quantification.
A sequent calculus is used to define intuitionistic provability over these formulas. A sequent is a triple, written C ; I' + B, where C is a signature, r is a finite (possibly empty) set of C-formulas, and B is a C-formula. The set I? is the antecedent and B is the succedent of this sequent. Intuitionistic provability is given by the sequent proof system Z displayed in Figure 1 . Since antecedents are sets of formulas, the structural rules of contraction and weakening are not needed. The notation r, B is short for I ' U { B ) and the notation I?, A is short for I? U A . The two universal introduction rules have the following provisos: in Q-L t must be a C-term of type T; in Q-R y must be a token that is not in C. A rule that permits formulas in the premise sequent to be replaced with a-convertible formulas in the conclusion is implicitly assumed to be available whenever' it is needed. We write C; r ! -B to mean that the sequent C ; r 4 B has a sequent proof. Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem [7] can be used on Z to prove that if a sequent is provable then it is provable without the cut rule. The rest of this paper considers only cut-free proofs.
Logic Programming
The proof system Z can be used as the basis of a logic programming language since a goal-directed style of theorem proving is complete for it. Goal-directed provability can be formalized within general sequent calculus proof systems using the notion of uniform proof [22] : a cut-free sequent proof is uniform if whenever the succedent in an occurrence of a sequent is not atomic, that sequent occurrence is the conclusion of a right-introduction rule. Within Z, this means that if the occurrence of a sequent has a succedent that is a conjunction, implication, or universal quantifier, that sequent occurrence is the result of the A-R, >-R, or V-R rules, respectively. The following proposition follows from considering permutations of inference rules in cut-free proofs. Stronger results are established in [22] . If the sequent C ; ---t B has a proof in 2, it has a uniform proof. In other words, the following equivalences hold. o C ; r t B1 AB2 i f a n d o n l y i f C ; r t Bl a n d C ; I ' t B2. o C ; r t B 1 > B 2 i f a n d o n l y i f C ; I '~{ B 1 } l -B 2 . where A is atomic and VZ is some list of universally quantified variables. Backchaining will be described below in a setting where this restriction on program formulas is not assumed. This is not problematic because formulas built freely from A, >, and V can be related directly to conjunctions of restricted clauses via the following simple intuitionistic equivalences:
(provided in the last case that x is not free in B1). The following definitions are a simple way to capture these equivalences and incorporate them into a sequent proof system. Let I? be a finite set of C-formulas. 
well as the initial rule. Thus, consider the proof system 1 ' that is the result of deleting the cut and initial rules and the three left-introduction rules from 2 and replacing them with the BC rule (for backchaining) given in Figure 2 . It is worth noting that, in general, applicability of BC is difficult to check: it is equivalent to doing "higherorder matching," which is not known to be decidable. We shall only be interested in using this inference rule in the restricted setting of LA, and there (as a consequence of Proposition 7.3) determining the applicability of BC will be decidable. The following proposition follows from results in [22] . This proposition can be used to describe a non-deterministic interpreter that first decomposes goal formulas using right-introduction rules and then attempts to backchain to prove atomic goals. Moving from this style of non-deterministic interpreter to an actual deterministic interpreter is a difficult task. Various aspects of implementing such an interpreter are considered in [5, 24, 261 . In order to motivate the introduction of the restrictions defining LA, it is important to note that the above non-deterministic interpreter will need to perform P-reductions while looking for proofs. That is, although programs and goals start out in A-normal form (by the definition of C-formulas), substitutions may cause them to become non-normal. Thus, the use of the Anorm() function in the definition of IF(c is necessary in general. Unification in this setting is complex because p-conversion can cause significant changes to a term. LA will be restricted in such a way that only a very simple fragment of general p-conversion is required in the interpreter. As a result, unification in that language will be much simpler than for the full, unrestricted logic.
As we motivated in Section 2, we wish to restrict P-reductions that need to be performed within a theorem prover for this logic. The only place where Anorm() is used in the description of the proof system 2' is within the definition of lFlc used in backchaining. In order to restrict the formation of P-redexes in proofs, we need to restrict occurrences of those universally quantified variables for formulas that can be instantiated in the definition of IF(c. Such quantifier instances are those that can appear at the top-level of a formula in the antecedent. A universal quantifiers that can appear at the top-level of the succedent do not need to be restricted since they are instantiated by only new constants and not general terms. Thus we must make a distinction between formulas that can occur in antecedents and those that can occur in succedents. Using the operational reading of such formulas in logic programming, we shall informally refer to formulas that can appear in the antecedent as program formulas, definite formulas, or just D-formulas. Formulas that can appear in succedents will be called queries, goals, or G-formulas. We now motivate our eventual definitions of both G and D-formulas.
Let C be a signature and let B be a C-formula. If B is to be considered a G-formula, then we classify bound variables in B as follows: A bound variable occurrence in B is essentially universal if it is bound by a positive occurrence of a universal quantifier or by a (term-level) A-abstraction in B; otherwise, it is essentially existential; that is, it is bound by a negative universal quantifier in G. Dually, if B is to be considered a D-formula, then a bound variable occurrence in B is essentially universal if it is bound by a negative occurrence of a universal quantifier or by a (term-level) A-abstraction in B; otherwise, it is essentially existential; that is, it is bound by a positive universal quantifier in G.
The central restriction in LA is that for every subterm in B of the form (x yl . . . y,) (n > 0) where x is essentially existentially quantified in B, it must be the case that yl, . . . , y, is a list of distinct variables that are essentially universally quantified within the scope of the binding for x. This restriction ensures that if x is ever instantiated by some term, say t , then the only P-redexes that appear after that substitution are of the form (tyl . . . y,) where the variables yl,. . . , y, are not free in t. Using a and q-conversions, we can assume that t is of the form Xyl . . . Ayn.tl. Thus, P-reduction I simply reduces (Ayl . . . Xyn.tl)yl . . . y, to t . Let Po-conversion be that subcase of Pconversion that relates redexes of the form (Ax.s)x to s. As is mentioned in Section 9, the equational theory of LA is only that of a , Po, and 7-conversions.
This restriction on G and D-formulas can be described more formally using the proof system in Figure 3 . Let & denote a quantifier prefix, that is, a list of universal and existential quantifiers in which the quantified variables are all distinct. Quantifier in prefixes are slightly richer than those in C-formulas; in particular, universal quantifiers of predicate types and existential quantifiers (of non-predicate types) are allowed. We 0 write Q ko t : T if the sequent Q --+ t : T is provable, Q t -
provable, and Q k+ B if the sequent Q 2 B is provable. This proof system has four provisos. The first two, (a) and (I), deal with only bound variable names and hence are not significant restrictions. The remaining two restrictions are of more consequence.
( a ) The term t (resp., the formula G, D ) is a-convertible to t' (G', Dl).
(t) The variable x does not occur in Q.
(1) Q contains V h where the type on the quantifier is TI + . --+ Tn + T (n > 0).
(fl)
The variable x is existentially quantified in Q to the left of where the distinct variables yl, . . . , y, (n > 0) are universally quantified. The quantifier for x has type TI + . . --t T, t T while the quantifiers for yl,. . . , y, have type 71,. . . , Tn, respectively. is an example of a G-formula but not a D-formula. As a D-formula of LA, it has a subterm occurrence (x y) where both x and y are essentially existential, and this is ruled out by proviso (#). Section 10 contains several examples of G and D-formulas.
An interpreter for LA
Interpretation of LA can be described as a bottom-up search for goal-directed proofs.
The BACKCHAIN step is, of course, the most difficult to implement since it requires chosing a D-formula and terms to substitute into that formula. The interpreter described below uses unification to discover what instances of D-formulas lead to successful BACKCHAINing steps.
In such an interpreter, it is necessary to keep track of notions such as the "current goal," the "current program," the "current signature," and restrictions on free variables. Interpreters for Horn clauses need to keep track of only the first of these: there the current program and signature remain unchanged during a computation, and restrictions on free variables do not need to be made. In the description of an interpreter for LA given below, explicit meta-level quantification is used to encode both the current signature and the restrictions on free variables, and sequents are used to connect programs to goals.
Consider the simple meta-logic that contains the logical constants A, T (true), I
(false), V, ( 7 ranges over all types, including predicate types), and 3, (T ranges over all non-predicate types). does not contain any meta-level, universally quantified variables but does contain all of the meta-level, existentially quantified variables of S . Also, let 3,x occur in S and let C be the set of typed universally quantified variables in which 3,x is in the scope. Then cpx must be a C-term of type T. In this sense, an S-substitution is a closed substitution; that is, its substitution terms do not contain existentially quantified variables. It is for convenience that variables other than existentially quantified variables are permit in the domain of such S-substitutions: since such variables are neither free nor quantified in the meta-level of S, they shall play no role in the interpreter. Two S-substitutions, say p and $, are equal if for each 3,x in S, yx = +x. In that case, we write 9 = $ (mod S ) .
It is possible that for a given S, there may not be any S-substitutions. For example, if E is the signature { f : i 3 i, g : i + i + i) and S is QE3;x(x x), there is no Ssubstitution since there is no A-term of type i whose only free tokens are f and g. That is, the type i is, in a sense, empty. Since the problem of determining if there is an S-substitution for a given S reduces to proving theorems in the implicational fragment of intuitionistic logic, this problem is decidable [35] .
An S-substitution cp satisfies S if (i) S does not contain I, (ii) for every equation t s in S, cpt Xconv cps, and (iii) for every sequent judgement P --+ G in S, the
has a proof in 2' (where C is the set of typed universal variables in which this sequent is in the scope). A solution to S is an S-substitution that satisfies S. By definition, a state formula containing I has no solutions. Generally, p is neither an S nor an Sf-substitution: instead, composing it with an S1-substitution yields an S-substitution. The following four transition rules describe the heart of a non-deterministic interpreter. Each of these transitions describes how to make a labeled transition, where the label p is the empty substitution. In each case, S' is built by replacing a sequent judgement in S by a formula.
AND step. Replace a sequent of the form P --, G1 A Gp with the conjunction A UGMENT step. Replace a sequent of the form P + D > G with the sequent
GENERIC step. Replace a sequent of the form P ---r V,x.G with the quantified formula V,y(P --+ [x H y]G), where y is a token not in S .
BACKCHAIN step. Replace a sequent of the form P + A with
where A and ,4' are atomic formulas, (Q, { G I , . . . , G,), A') E elab(S, P), and n 2 0.
If n = 0 then the above displayed formula is simply Q(A A'). If there is no such member of elab(S, 'P) (that is, P is empty), then replace that sequent with I.
If D-formulas were restricted to Horn clauses and G-formulas to conjunctions of atoms, then the structure of these transitions could be greatly simplified. In particular, the GENERIC and AUGMENT transition steps would not be needed; the antecedent of all sequents in state formulas would be the same; and meta-level quantification would simply be outermost universal variables and inner-most existential quantifiers (no quantifier alternations), in which case the notion of S-substitution simplifies to the notion of substitution. 21' 203 , where u' is not bound in S. Build S' from S by dropping the quantifier 31.4, replacing the one quantifier 3v with the two quantifiers 3v3u1, and applying p to all the judgements in S. The fact that the tokens in w may appear in substitution terms for u is made explicit by replacing u with a "higher-type" token u', which may not be instantiated with a term containing those tokens, applied explicitly to w. is not bound in S. The formula S' is the result of replacing 3u with 3u1 and applying p to all judgements in S. build S' by replacing this equation with T, dropping 3v, and applying p to all remaining judgements in S . These transitions are organized into a deterministic algorithm below. We shall leave unspecified those choices that could give rise to a-convertible state formulas or to different orderings on existential (or universal) variables in a sequence of existential (or universal) variables. Such differences are inconsequential and can be fixed largely arbitrarily.
Unification Algorithm.
To solve the equations in a given initial state formula So, order the choice of transitions using the following three steps. These choices are made until there are no equations left or until I appears in a state formula. This gives rise to a series of transitions So . . . SS, (n 2 0). The result of the unification algorithm is the pair (pl o . . . o p,, S,).
(1) Apply either the ( or the rigid-rigid step to the first applicable equation found in a left-to-right transversal of the state formula. If neither of these steps applies, move to the next step. Apply the raising and then the pruning steps to that equation and its converse until these transitions can no longer be applied: then move on to the next step. The exact order in which the various raising steps or various pruning steps are applied can be specified arbitrarily. The substitutions, named p above, generated by individual transitions are of two kinds. Those generated by the flexible-rigid step are of the form [ 
Correctness of the unification transitions
We first show that there can be no infinite series of unification transitions. (Of course, It 1 also has S as an argument, but its value will always be clear from context.)
The weight of a meta-level, universal quantifier is the number of occurrences of metalevel, existential quantifiers in its scope. A universally quantified variable r of S is possibly prunable from an equational judgement t = s of S if z occurs free in either t or s but not both and if all existentially quantified variables of S that are free in the term in which z is not free contain Vz in their scope. Thus if z is possibly prunable from t = s and z occurs free in s then no S-substitution instance of t contains z free. If the transition is the < step, the number of abstractions in equations decreases.
If the transition is the rigid-rigid step, then either the number of applications decreases or the number of equations decreases. Thus in either of these cases, IS1( < ISI.
If the transition is the pruning step, either the number of equations is reduced by one or all components of the measure are unchanged except for the last, which gets strictly smaller. Thus JSII < ISJ.
In the first case of the flexible-flexible step, the number of existentially quantified variables decreases by one. Hence, the overall measure decreases. In the second case, the number of existentially quantified variables and the number of occurrences of applications not in the scope of existentially quantified variables remain the same. Since the number of equations decreases, the overall measure decreases.
Finally, if St arises from S by applying the flexible-rigid case, the number of equations reduces by one and an existentially quantified variable from S may also be deleted.
Thus, again IS1[ < IS(. 8
The following lemma and propositions show that the unification transitions can be used to determine whether or not solutions exist and to characterize all of them if they do exist.
Lemma 7.2.
Assume that S =% St is a unification transition. The solutions to S can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the solution to Sf so that if the solution y for S corresponds to the solution y f for St then p o y' = y (m0d.S). Proof. Assume that the transition is the raising step. That is, the state formula changed by lifting 3u up over the universally quantified variables in 6 to get the quantifier 3u' and p = [u H ulw] is applied to all judgements. The correspondence of solutions is given by either letting vf be the result of replacing u I+ s in y with u' I+ Xw.s, or conversely, letting y be the result of replacing u' H r in with u I-+ Xnorm(r6). Since y and y1 differ only on u and uf and since ( p o v')u = yt(u'6) = (Xw.s)6 Xconv s = yu, it follows that p o v1 = v (mod S ) . Notice that raising is a general transition for unification problems: it is dependent only on the scope of quantifiers and not on the judgements of the state formula. A fuller description of this transition is presented in
POI.
If the transition is the [ step, the result follows immediately since p is the empty substitution and the set of solutions does not change. 
Correctness of interpretation
We can now prove the correctness of the interpreter described in Section 5. 
Proof.
We proceed by considering the cases that can cause a transition in the interpreter. The cases when this transition is a unification transition follow from Lemma 7.2. In all the other cases, p is empty so we simply need to show that a solution cp to St is a solution to S. To do this, we need to show that if J is a judgement in S , then either cpJ is T , an equation between A-convertible terms, or a sequent that has an Z'-proof. Since St arises from changing one judgement of S, we simply need to show that that one judgement has this property. Let + be defined as +t = Anorm(cpt).
Assume that the transition is caused by the BACKCHAIN step. That is, the state changed by replacing a sequent P + A with the conjunction where A and A' are atomic formulas, (Q, {GI, . . . , G,) , A') E elab(S, P), and n 2 0. Let cp satisfy S' and let C be the set of universally quantified variables of S with P + A in their scope. To show that cp also satisfies S, it is necessary to show that if @ A = +A1
and for every i = 1,. . . , n , C ; +P d +G, has an 1'-proof, then C ; $7) 4 +G has an Z'-proof. This follows immediately if it is the case that ({+GI,. . . , @G,), @A1) E I+Plc, which follows by a simple induction on the definition of elab given the fact that (Q, {GI 7 . --, Gn), A') E elab(S, P). so that 9 o cp' = cp (mod S). Proof. The only-if part of this theorem follows by induction and Lemma 8.1. Assume that cp satisfies S . Thus, for every judgement J of S,either J is T , cp J is an equation between A-convertible terms, or p J specifies a sequent with an 2'-proof. Define the measure llSll to be the pair (n, m) where m is the number of equational judgements in S and n is the sum of the number of inference rules in minimal 2t-proofs proving all the sequent judgements in S . Here, "minimal" is with respect to the number of occurrences of inference rules in a proof. These pairs are ordered lexicographically. The proof is completed by induction on the measure 1ISII.
If S contains any equality judgements, apply the unification algorithm of Section 7 and make the transition S 2 S t . By Proposition 7.3, there is a solution 9' for St so that 8' o 9' = 9 (mod S ) . Since /IS1 11 < IISII, the inductive hypothesis provides a , 6" transition S 2 S" where the only judgements in St' are T and an S"-substitution 9" so that 0' o y" = 9' (mod S t ) . Thus, setting 9 to 0' o 0It, we have S % S" and 0 0 9 " = 9 (mod S ) .
If S has some sequent judgement, say P + G, then let C be the list of typed, universally quantified variables in which this sequent is in the scope. The structure of a minimal Zt-proof of C ; qP ---+ y G dictates which transition can be performed. In particular, if the last inference rule in such a proof is A-R, use the AND step; if it is >-R, use the AUGMENT step; if it is V-R, use the GENERIC step; if it is BC, use the BACKCHAIN step. We illustrate this final case in more detail since it is the hardest.
Again, let 9 be defined as $t = Anorm(9t).
Since the last rule is BC, G is atomic and there is a (A,@G) E I@Plc such that for every H E A, C ; cpP ---+ H has an 2'-proof. By induction on the definition of elaboration, there is a triple (3x1 . . . The non-deterministic interpreter for LA described in Section 5 can be thought of doing computation in the following fashion. Let S be Qc35(P + G), for some signature C. Here, P is considered to be a logic program and G a query to be proved.
The existential variables 3 are logic variables that the interpreter can instantiate as it needs in order to find a proof. Theorem 8.2 states that if the interpreter makes a transition S 2 St where all of the judgements of St are T, then for every S1-substitution cp', the substitution 8 o 9' restricted to the variables in f is a solution or a n s w e r substitution to this computation. Theorem 8.2 also states that if there is a solution to the initial state then there is a series of transitions in the interpreter that yields a state formula whose only judgements are T.
A simple, depth-first, deterministic interpreter for LA can be described as follows.
First, we must consider the antecedent of sequents as lists instead of sets. The AUG-MENT step concatenates formulas to the front of an antecedent. Elaboration, elab, must take a state formula and a list of D-formulas and return a list of triples in which the second component is a list. The only backtrack points that must be remembered are those arising from the BACKCHAIN step. When given a state containing I, backtrack in a depth-first manner. When given a state containing an equational judgement, apply the unification algorithm. Otherwise, the given state formula contains only T and sequent judgements. If there are no sequent judgements, then make no further transitions: this represents a success. If there are a sequent judgements, select the first such judgement in a left-to-right order. If the succedent of that sequent is a conjunction, implication, or universal quantifier, then apply the AND, AUGMENT, or GENERIC step, respectively. If the succedent is an atomic ibrmula, then select the first triple in the elaboration of the antecedent on which to backchain, leaving all the other members of the elaboration for subsequent backtracking. This style of search, although incomplete, is similar to the ones used in Prolog and AProlog.
Some Observations
Below are a few observations about unification and interpretation in LA. A state formula is a V3V-state formula if there are no meta-level, universal quantifiers that are in the scope of an existential quantifier and themselves contain an existential quantifier in their scope. Huet's unification procedure [13] deals with pq-unification, sometimes called "higher-order" unification, for V3V-unification problems.
As the author shows in [20] , Huet's procedure can be extended to the case where the meta-level quantification is not so restricted. Applying this extended version to the unification problems considered in this paper results in the reduction of the unification problem to problems that contain only flexible-flexible equational judgements. In the general, unrestricted setting, computing unifiers for flexible-flexible equations is very unconstrained and undirected, so it is often best avoided. In the LA case, however, flexible-flexible equations are simple enough that their solutions can be completely characterized. Generalizations of the raising, pruning, and flexible-flexible steps described in Section 6 to /?q-unification can be found in [20] . The algorithm presented here can be derived directly from that paper. While Poq-unification is much weaker than pq-unification, it is possible to specify declaratively Pq-unification problems as logic programs within LA. Section 10 presents aspects of this specification and [I91 describes the full translation.
9.2. V3V-Quant ification. If a unification problem has the V3V-quantification structure, then any transition on such a problem yields a problem which is also V3V. On such problems, the raising step is never applicable although raising can be used to transform any unification problem into a V3V-unification problem. Thus, for the considerations of just unification, only V3V-unification problems are needed. Nipkow in [27] presents a version of the LA unification algorithm that works essentially on unification problems with V3V quantification only. When considering the problem of interpreting L A , however, a transition from a state formula that has the V3V form does not necessarily yield a similarly restricted state formula. Thus, after applying a BACKCHAINING step to a V3V-state formula, it might be necessary to apply the raising step several times to yield a V3V-state formula. Pairing of the raising step with backchaining is essentially the same as V-lifting in [29] .
Let S be a unification problem and let S % S1 and S %= S2 where S1 and S2 contain neither equations nor I. Is it possible to compare and 02? As is shown in Section 7, these substitutions correspond to most general unifiers. In the first-order setting, two such most general unifiers differ only in the name of (existentially bound) variables. Given that the meta-level, quantificational structure of S1 and S2 can differ, it is not possible to so simply characterize such a relation between O1 and 02. If, however, S is a V3V-unification problem, then so too are S1 and S2. In this case, we can describe a simple relationship between O1 and 82. We first need the following lemma that holds for general state formulas. Its proof is immediate.
Lernrna9.1. L e t s beaunificationproblemandlet S % S t .
(i) The solutions to S can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the solutions to St so that if the solution q for S corresponds to the solution y t for S' then 0 o y t = y . Let j E (1, . . . , m ) . The only variables that can be free in pl y j are either the ii variables or outer-most, universally quantified variables of S . The latter case is not possible, however, since such a variable would also need to appear free in p2(pl y j ), but this is simply yj. By Lemma9.1 (ii), if x, occurs in plyj, for some i = 1,. . . , n , then that occurrence of xi is such that it is applied to only A-bound variables of plyj. Thus, the only possible structure for plyj is a term of the form AG.xiG for some i = 1,. . . , n and where ti is a list of distinct variables taken from the list G. A similar observation holds for the term p2xi for i E (1,. . . , n). Finally, yj = p2(plyj) = p2(AzE.xi6) = AG.(pzxi)6 which is only possible if p 2~i Aconv AC.yjG. Thus, 6 and G are permutations of each other. Since the converse relation between xi and yj must also hold, the list 2 and must be of equal lengths (n = m) and the connection between index i and index j is a permutation. Thus, both pl and p2 are variable renaming substitutions. 1
Untyped versions of unification and interpretation.
Type information was used in very few places in the description of the unification and interpreter transitions. It is possible, in fact, to describe an untyped version of LA and of the unification and interpreter transitions. The fact that Poq-unification is independent of types means that it can be used in various different typed A-calculi. For example, Pfenning in [31] uses a variation of LA-unification in the Calculus of Constructions. This situation is different from that of the full pq-theory of equality: types play a significant role in the search for solutions in the procedures given in [13] and in [19] .
An untyped version of terms and G and D-formulas arises by simply deleting the typing information from inference rules in Figure 3 . In that system, essentially existential variables can occur in predicate positions. Logic programming languages with such possibilities have been analyzed elsewhere [22, 251. Here we shall assume that the two inference rules that permit the inference of an atomic D-formula and of an atomic G-formula are modified as in Figure 4 . There the proviso (5) is that Q contains Vh and that n 2 0. This restriction ensures that the resulting language is first-order in the sense that predicate substitutions never need to be considered. Notice that in this It should be noticed that the ( step uses 7-expansion, and that 7-expansion can differ between the typed calculus (where it can only be used on terms of functional type) and the untyped calculus (where there is no such restriction). As this step is described, however, 7-expansion is only used on terms which, if typed, must have functional type. Hence, no modification to this step is necessary.
The results in Section 7 and 8 can be established for the untyped case. As was mentioned in Section 5, there may be no S-substitutions in the typed setting for a given S: in the typed case the fact that the unification algorithm returns a state formula not containing I is not enough to guarantee that there exist solutions. In the untyped case, there are always S-substitutions for every untyped state formula S. Thus, in the untyped setting, a unification problem has no solutions if and only if the unification algorithm returns a state formula containing I.
Examples of LA programs
The logic programming language XProlog [24] fully implements LA as well as the more general class of higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas [22] : the author has no experience in using an interpreter designed only to handle the LA subset. See [5] for a functional programming implementations of interpreters for languages such as LA and XProlog; see [23, 261 for discussions concerning the compilation of these languages.
Below we present several examples of LA programs written using the syntax of XProlog. The symbol => denotes >, :-denotes its converse, a comma denotes con- declares i to be a primitive type, declares the type for four predicate constants (the type of propositions is the built-in type o), and presents one D-formula, which could be written as ((bug b A in b J ) 3 dead b) 3 sterile J ) .
VJ(Vb
In all the examples given in this section, once types are given for constants, the type of bound variables can easily be inferred from their context.
Much of the formal and technical detail of the preceding several sections was caused by the difficulty of keeping track of bound variable names and scope. Since all these details have now formally been incorporated .inside LA, programs written using LA should be relieved of some of the need to deal with these details. The following examples attempt to illustrate this point.
Specifying an object-logic.
Three meta-programs -substitution, Horn clause interpretation, and the computation of prenex normal forms -are presented in this section and all compute with the same first-order, object-logic. This object-logic contains universal and existential quantification and implication and conjunction. These are declared by the syntax The first two lines declare the tokens term and form as primitive types. The object-logic contains just five non-logical constants: an individual constant, a function symbol of one argument and another of two arguments, and a predicate symbol of one argument and another of two arguments. Their types are declared with the following lines. Terms over this signature of type form denote object-logic formulas and of type term denote object-logic terms. We shall need to lift this typing information more directly into the meta-language by introducing the following two meta-level predicates and formulas. These formulas are obviously derived directly from the above signature. ( Various other meta-predicates over ob ject-logic formulas are easy to write. For example, the following defines a predicate that determines whether or not its argument is a quantifier-free object-level formula. is attempted, the variable c will get bound to the A-abstraction u \ ( a l l v\(imp (and (4 v a) (q a u ) ) (p u ) ) ) .
The intended processing of this A-abstraction can be described by the following set of operations. Via the universally quantified goal, a new constants is picked (modeled as a new universal quantifier in a state formula). This new constant will play the role of a name for the bound variable x. Since this new constant is now temporarily part of the object-logic, D-formulas that were determined from the signature of the objectlogic may need to be extended. Thus, the definition of the term predicate needs to be extended with the fact that this new constant is a term. Thus, when hornc subsequently calls atom, the latter predicate will succeed for formulas containing this new constant. 
Implementing object-level substitution.
Equality and substitution at the object-level can be implemented by first specifying the following copy-clauses. copyterm (g X Y) (g U V) :-copyterm X U, copyterm Y V . copyform (p X) (p U)
:-copyterm X U. copyform (q X Y) (q U V) :-copyterm X U, copyterm Y V . copyform (and X Y) (and U V) :-copyform X U, copyform Y V . copyform (imp X Y) (imp U V) :-copyform X U, copyform Y V . copyform ( a l l X) ( a l l U) . -pi y\(pi z\(copyterm y z => copyform (X y ) (U z ) ) ) . copyform (some X) (some U)
:-p i ~\ ( p i z\(copyterm y z => copyf orm (X y) (U z ) ) ) .
These clauses can be derived directly from the object-level signature using the following function. Let It, s : be a formula defined by recursion on the structure of the type T , which is assumed to be built only from the base types term The extension of these copy-clauses is exactly the same as that for equality. That is, (copyterm t s) is provable from these'clauses if and only if t and s are the same term.
